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Aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere solebat1
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas2
I. THE WATER Cmisis
For more than a decade, it has been asserted that a water crisis is im-
pending in the Eastern United States. As a society, we are becoming "water
poor." Our wasteful habitual and traditional methods of water use must be
changed, or they will only serve to aggravate the crisis. The present tendency
is to assume that this water crisis will manifest itself at some ascertainable
moment in time: that some day when we turn the faucet, no water will
appear; that some morning we will awaken to discover the Mississippi
dry; that some authoritative source will at a particular hour of a given day
declare that all our available water is being used.
But the crisis will not occur so dramatically. The time of its arrival
will never be known with precision. The appearance of such a crisis is not
announced by a manifest increase in litigation or by a sudden prolifera-
tion of water disputes. Instead, it is evidenced by things which persons in
our society do not do. A city does not grow or its growth is impeded; a cor-
*The preparation of this article has been supported in part by the Office
of Water Resources Research of the United States Department of the Interior as
authorized by the Water Resources Research Act of 1964. This grant of financial
support was made by the Water Resources Center of the University of Missouri.
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia
1. Water flows and ought to flow, as it has customarily flowed.
2. So use your own as not to injure that of another. This and the maxim
in note 1 supra are legal maxims that have been frequently quoted over the
decades by appellate courts in the Eastern United States in decisions relating to
the use of water. The underlying policies which they express are not consistent,
and much of the history of our water use law is comprehended within the struggle
between these principles. The first, Aqua currit . . . , finds its basis in the status
quo, and the need for preservation of established values. Its effect in modern
water law tends to be negative, for it would rigidly impose upon contemporary
society the conditions which our ancestors created or suffered to exist. The second,
Sic utero tuo ... , stresses the correlative nature of interests in real property, and
more particularly of the interests of persons owning land upon which watercourses
flow. Since all have common interests in the watercourses, the use or non-use of the
water by one proprietor will affect all others. This maxim expresses a concern for
the affirmative need of society to use the water while continuing to develop new
beneficial uses for it. It suggests a principle whereby conflict may be resolved and
constitutes an important ingredient in the doctrine of reasonable use.
The struggle between the principles inherent in these two maxims continues
today in relation to water rights law. Any claim that the riparian system of reason-
able use be retained in the Eastern states, which is the crux of the following dis-
cussion, hangs in the balance.
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poration determines not to expand; or not to locate a new plant in a given
area; a farmer does not develop a supplemental irrigation system for his
crops; a region does not prosper, but stagnates.3 Persons needing water are
compelled to resort to more expensive and burdensome alternative sources.
Some will, at a cost, develop substitutes, others will relocate where an ade-
quate supply of water is available, while yet others will divert their energies
and resources to other fields of endeavor.
It may be objected that no new realities have been depicted; that what
is described is a water crisis which has always been with us. One does not
develop water uses in the midst of an unpeopled, waterless desert. Where
people and markets are found, if all readily available water is being used,
one needing water must either acquire the supply of another, invest to
develop a new source of water, or devote his resources to some other pur-
suit. This is therefore no new crisis, but a continuing, perpetual problem.
It will continue until that unlikely day when man is able to produce with-
out cost, at any location, a limitless supply of usable water.
But it can be answered that never before have matters attained
the critical stage they now have reached. Acute water shortages have arisen
and threaten to become more desperate as our population continues to grow
and as per capita water use increases. Demand grows, and the natural sup-
ply remains static. It is only a question of time before the one overtakes
the other, and in some places it is likely that this has already occurred.
Worse still, the law does not prevent the waste of a great deal of what
water is available.
The solution to the water problem must involve one or more of
several limited alternatives. We must either: (1) develop new sources of
water; (2) reduce our per capita water use; (3) stop our population growth;
or (4) use our present supply of water more efficiently. Any solution will
draw heavily upon science and technology. Through them we will learn to
remove the salt from ocean water, to purify polluted waters, to distribute
water economically over great distances, and to reduce the waste and even
the use of water.
Nonetheless, the solution is not uniquely technological. Economics and
the law also have a vital part to play. Scientific solutions must be eco-
nomically sound. Their cost must either be within the means of private
industry in our profit-oriented system, or be socially acceptable if the cost
is to be borne by the public. Moreover, the law governing the use of
water influences greatly the ability and inclination of persons in society to
resort to improved and less wasteful means of water use. Water law must
be sufficiently definite to enable persons to predict the consequences of
3. It is easy to be complacent about water law, to adopt a wait-
and-see attitude, to say that there is no present emergency crying
for action. But if this attitude is taken, the state may never know
what it has lost through the lack of development.
Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin Development, 22 LAw &
CONTrMP. PROB. 301, 321 (1957).
[Vol. 35
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their actions. It should allow use of water without placing an arbitrary
limitation upon the manner or place of use. The law can provide induce-
ment, or compulsion, if necessary, to make persons use water efficiently.
The law relating to water use in the Eastern States has become a
scapegoat. Its relative uncertainty, once praised as flexibility, is now criti-
cised as offering no firm foundation for establishing in quantitative terms
the nature and extent of water use rights. Restrictions upon place of use,
and upon who may use water are said to frustrate development and prevent
"the highest beneficial use" of the existing supply. Similarly, few induce-
ments are held out to water users to make the most beneficial use of the
water available to them.
It is clear that the law will create no new water. But it may either act
as a positive force to bring about a more beneficial use of the existing water
supply or it may block progress and hinder development of more beneficial
uses and thereby contribute to the waste of this vital resource. It has been
charged that the existing water law in the Eastern States, the doctrine of
riparian rights, not only falls short of being optimum but is actively harm-
ful because it prevents the full beneficial use of water. To what extent are
these charges true?
II. THE DIMENSIONS OF RIPARIANISM
Riparianism is reasonable use. 4
In the beginning men were few and water plentiful. Conflicts over
water were improbable. It was only necessary that a man avoid intentional
infliction of harm upon his neighbor, as by deliberately turning away a
watercourse so that it did not reach the neighbor, or by so defiling the
waters that they were unfit for use. Elaborate rules were unnecessary. All
that was required was that men follow the maxim Sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas. This maxim found heightened expression in water law as reason-
able use, and was first articulated in American courts in the early nineteenth
century. The concept that water may be used freely, so long as the use is
reasonable, is an appealing one. It has been equated with the Golden Rule. 5
4. Some legal writers have asserted that riparianism embraces two distinct
doctrines, "natural flow" and "reasonable use." Kinyon, What Can a Riparian
Proprietor Do?, 21 MINN. L. REv. 512 (1937); 4 REsrATEMENT (First) oF ToRTs §
849 at 341-47 (1939). Kinyon's research evidently provided the basis for the Re-
statement's somewhat amplified view; he served as an adviser to Division 10 of the
Restatement, which includes water rights. Analysis of the decisions cited by Kinyon,
however, indicates that while some differences exist between different Eastern
jurisdictions in the treatment of nonriparian use, these differences hardly provide
an adequate foundation for the conclusion that there are two distinct and separate
doctrines. The Restatement hedges somewhat upon the matter, with a lame state-
ment that while a "few courts" adhere to each of the "natural flow" and "reason-
able use" doctrines, most courts have simply been guilty of "either not realizing
that there are two distinct theories or not fully grasping their fundamental dif-
ferences." 4 RESTATEMIENT (FIRST) OF TORTS supra at 346. The so-called "natural
flow" doctrine will be examined in detail in a forthcoming article.
5. Brown, The Golden Rule As a Maxim of the Modern Law of 'Water
Rights, 56 AM. L. REv. 401 (1922).
1970]
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The riparian doctrine, however, does not consist solely of the concept of
reasonable use. Judicial opinions have developed, refined and limited its
content, to the point that the mature doctrine is encrusted with numerous
qualifications upon the pure notion of reasonable use. It might even be
suggested that "reasonable use" as applied to the riparian doctrine has be-
come a misnomer. As will be developed in the discussion to follow, the
doctrine as propounded does not appear to ensure reasonable use of water
resources. A more adequately descriptive term might be "limited relative
beneficial use," with emphasis upon "limited" and "relative."
A. The Character of the Riparian Doctrine
The riparian doctrine applies to watercourses. Basically it is that a
person owning land adjoining a stream may make use of the waters thereof,
provided that the use is reasonable in the light of the uses of water being
made by others similarly situated upon the same source. The character of
the land ownership required-that of the ripa, or banks of the watercourse-
gives rise to the term "riparian" as descriptive of the doctrine itself.
The concept of reasonable use transcends watercourses, and has also
been applied to the use of waters of lakes6 and underground waters.7 How-
ever, the present examination will be confined to riparianism proper. It is
appropriate at this point to note that the fully developed riparian doctrine
described by legal writers over the past century and a half will only seldom
be found in the jurisprudence of any given Eastern state. In most states,
only a limited portion of the doctrine has been adopted by the courts,
principally because legal disputes have infrequently arisen requiring judicial
exploration and declaration of the extreme limits of the doctrine.8 Many
courts have not been called upon to refine the doctrine beyond a rudimen-
tary statement of its adoption and existence within the jurisdiction.9
6. See, e.g., VI-A AmERiCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.55 (1954); 1 R. CLARK,
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs § 52.1 (D) (1967).
7. See, e.g., 1 R. CLARK, supra note 6, § 52.2 (B) (3); Ziegler, Water Use
Under Common Law Doctrines, in WATER RsouRcrs AND TnE LAW 51, 76 (1958).
8. The riparian rights doctrine has also been adopted to some degree in
the Western states of California, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington, where it coexists with the prior
appropriation doctrine. While a great volume of riparian rights litigation has
arisen in these jurisdictions, the resulting flood of judicial opinions should be re-
ferred to very hesitatingly, if at all, in any examination of Eastern water law. These
Western decisions are not used as a basis for the discussion of riparianism in this
article. The reasons for this exclusion is that Western conditions are significantly
different from those in the Eastern states, in terms of climate, water supply, and
water use; and the Western courts have tended to sharply restrict the riparian
right in favor of the right of prior appropriation. A more thorough discussion of
this often-ignored distinction is found in Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property,
in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAv 131, 167-69 (1958).
9. In Missouri, for example, the paucity of judicial decision resulted in a
heated debate as to whether the "natural flow" or "reasonable use" doctrine of
water use would be followed in this State. Comment, The Rights of a Riparian
Landowner in Missouri, 19 Mo. L. REv. 138 (1954). Interestingly, if this question is
[Vol. 35
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The basis of the riparian right is access to the watercourse. 10 An in-
terest in land adjacent to the watercourse gives rise to the riparian right;
indeed, the right to the use of the water has been said to be "part and par-
cer' of such land. A possessory interest in riparian land seems necessary;
and easement or license which gives access to a watercourse is not enough.
Fundamentally, the right is to the flow of water. Since the earliest de-
cisions it has been held that the riparian proprietor has no ownership of
the corpus of the water in the stream." In 1827 Justice Story said concern-
ing the riparian's land ownership:
In virtue of this ownership he has a right to the use of the
water flowing over it in its natural current, without diminution or
obstruction. But, strictly speaking, he has no property in the water
itself; but a simple use of it, while it passes along.12
Once removed from the watercourse, however, the water itself may be-
come the subject of ownership.
Water may be used upon riparian land, but the doctrine forbids
use elsewhere. The reason for this restriction has never been made dear,
beyond a fear that riparian owners would suffer a shortage of water if
nonriparians were admitted to its use.' 3 Divergence exists as to the ex-
tent of the riparian tract. Some courts have held that only the portion of
a tract which lies within the watershed of the stream to which it is riparian
constitutes the riparian portion.' 4 Others have restricted riparian rights
one of any great significance (which it may not be), it should be observed that the
Missouri courts have not definitively established that the reasonable use test is the
law of the state. However, the Missouri Supreme Court came very close in Bollinger
v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. 1964), involving an artificial watercourse,
where the court observed:
Missouri is notable for the fact that it has almost no statutory law con-
cerning rights of individual members of the public and of the public
generally in public water and watercourses, and such cases as there are
based on the common law usually arise from factual situations pertain-
ing to the existence of too much rather than too little water.
10. Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ex. 1851); Stockport Waterworks
Co. v. Potter, 159 Eng. Rep. 545 (Ex. 1864).
11. One may speculate as to what extent this emphasis upon the right to
the flow depended upon the fact that in the early 19th century the principal uses
of water were for powering mills, thus involving the use of the flow rather than
the corpus.
12. 24 Fed. Cas. 472, 474 (No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
13. See, e.g., Williams v. Wadsworth, 51 Conn. 277, 304-05 (1883) which states:
If land not riparian may draw to itself, equally with land riparian,
water for man and beast thereon, because it is in possession of a riparian
owner, then land not riparian may take precedence of land riparian and
deprive it of water for either man or beast. That such a possibility is
within the defendant's claim shows that it puts in jeopardy the well
established rule that the right of riparian land to water for man and
beast shall yield to nothing except like needs upon like land above.
14. The watershed limitation provides a splendid example of the tendency
of some legal writers to indulge in overly hasty generalization. Murphy, A Short
1970]
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to all land currently under single ownership which was part of a riparian
tract when title emanated from the sovereign, while a few have limited
riparian rights to the smallest tract which has continually remained ri-
parian.15 In any case, unitary ownership of a tract, some portion of which
is in contact with the watercourse, is required, and if a part of the tract
not adjacent to the stream is conveyed, it carries with it no riparian rights.
Thus it is clear that the basis for the right is access to the water from land
in which one has a possessory interest. It also seems that the natural
boundary of the watershed may limit the extent of the right, perhaps in
keeping with Story's observation that "[t]he natural stream, existing by the
bounty of Providence for the benefit of the land through which it flows,
is an incident annexed, by operation of law, to the land itself."'16
Judicial declarations tying the riparian right to the riparian land have
not, however, been strictly followed in most jurisdictions. Thus, it is gen-
erally recognized that a riparian may grant to another person, whether a
riparian or not, all or part of the riparian's right to the use of the water.17
Course on Water Law for the Eastern United States, 1961 WAsH. U.L.Q. 93, 114-15,
n. 114, purporting to describe Eastern water law, states:
The orientation of the common law of water is upon the rights of
riparian land owners. A strict application of that rule would permit stream
water to be used anywhere upon the land of a title-owner of any portion
of the stream bank. This however is the rule in only a trifling number ofjurisdictions. The overwhelming number make a further distinction which
limits the definition of riparian land to that portion lying within the
watershed of the stream whose waters the riverside owner wants to use." 4
114. The very slight minority view is set out in Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore.
30, 64 Pac. 855 (1901); Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86
S.W. 733 (1905). Ziegler, Water Use Under Common Law Doctrines, in
Water Resources and the Law 56-58 (1958), states the majority position,
quoting Farnham, II Waters and Water Rights 1571 (1904).
But an examination of Ziegler's monograph discloses that in support of what
Murphy calls the "overwhelming number" he cites cases from only four states-
California, Oregon, South Dakota, and Texas, which include two of the jurisdictions
Murphy has placed within the "trifling number" of the "very slight minority", and
none of which are Eastern states. Turning to Farnham, an examination of § 463a,
"What is riparian land?" shows that he cites decisions from only two states on the
point under consideration-California in support of the watershed limitation, and
New York opposing it. Farnham also cites Jones v. Conn, but not with reference
to the watershed rule.
Thus, upon examination of the given sources, Murphy's "overwhelming num-
ber" of states in the Eastern United States which allegedly favors the watershed
limitation turns out as follows: Eastern states favoring the watershed limitation: 0;
Eastern states opposing it: 1. (In deference to Professor Murphy, who is normally
a very sound legal scholar, it is just to point out that at least two Eastern states
appear to have adopted the watershed test. Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School,
216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913); Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508(1921).A. 5 R. POWELL, REALi PROPERTY 371-74 (1968). It should be noted that these
restrictions are almost entirely the product of courts in the Western states.
16. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 Fed. Cas. 472, 474 (No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
17. See, e.g., St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 41
Minn. 270, 43 N.W. 56 (1889); United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper
[Vol. 35
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But while the grantee of this right may be able to enforce it as against his
riparian grantor, he is unable to assert it successfully as against other ri-
parians who may interfere with his use of the water, or whose uses or rights
may be interfered with by his use.1 8
The riparian doctrine pertains solely to the use of watercourses and
does not interrelate other sources of water such as diffused surface water or
underground water. In other words, the doctrine ignores the existence
of the hydrological cycle; the man-made law disregards the manner in
which water occurs naturally. To date, this arbitrary segregation of water-
courses from other sources of water has not caused a great deal of difficulty
in the Eastern states; conflicts have been few, primarily because the de-
mands of use upon the varying forms have not been particularly large.19
It is dear, however, that as uses of water increase and the limits of the
various sources are approached, the effect of the use of streams and lakes,
or of ground water, or even of diffused surface water will begin to be felt
upon the other forms.2 0
B. The Nature of "Reasonable Use"
The essence of the riparian doctrine is that the standard of reasonable
use will be applied to determine controversies arising between riparian
owners over the use of the watercourse. The reasonable use concept is not
new. For over a century and a half it has furnished a basis for resolving
riparian disputes. Moreover, throughout this period the concept has con-
tinued to develop, to the end that significant change has occurred in the
application of the doctrine.
Eighteenth century water law concerned itself with maintaining the
status quo; use of a watercourse was protected if it could be demonstrated
to be an ancient use, having existed for at least twenty years.2 1 The sense
of the law was expressed in the maxim Aqua currit ....
The industrial revolution brought an end to this era. As water use
increased, conflicts arose, and the courts were compelled to consider in
greater detail the nature of relationships between water users. The need for
Co., 226 N.Y. 38, 123 N.E. 200 (1919). Statements in some cases appear to be
contra, but can probably be explained on the ground of excessive judicial zeal. In
Harvey Realty Co. v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 358-59, 150A. 60, 63(1930), for example, the court declared that "any attempted transfer of the right
made by a riparian to a nonripanan proprietor is invalid."
18. Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S.E. 897 (1909); Roberts v. Martin, 72
W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535 (1913). See Note, Are Water Rights Marketable in Wiscon-
sin?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 942.
19. See, e.g., Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S.E. 897 (1909); Springfield
Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895); Jones v. Pro-
prietors of the Portsmouth Aqueduct, 62 N.H. 488 (1883).
20. Dolson, Diffused Surface Water and Riparian Rights: Legal Doctrines in
Conflict, 1966 Wis. L. Rav. 58.
21. Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo.
L. REv. 60, 91-100 (1963).
1970]
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new doctrinal development was manifest. For a time, the English courts
flirted with simple prior use as a basis for giving a water right, but ulti-
mately rejected this. 22 Instead, the reasonable use doctrine was adopted.23
There appear to have been several stages in the development of the
reasonable use doctrine. At the outset, while the courts had begun to
recognize the correlative nature of the interests of different persons who
were using a single watercourse, the notion of retention of the status quo
was still very strong. The result was that some early statements of riparian
doctrine are almost schizophrenic in nature, seeking to embody both the
pre-existent law and the need for just apportionment of the water. Thus,
in the landmark 1827 case of Tyler v. Wilkinson, Mr. Justice Story, within
a single paragraph, made the following statements: (1) The riparian owner
has "a right to the use of the water . .. in its natural current, without
diminution or obstruction." (2) The riparian right "being common to all
the proprietors on the river, no one has a right to diminish the quantity
which will, according to the natural current, flow to a proprietor below, or
to throw it back upon a proprietor above." (8) "I do not mean to be under-
stood, as holding the doctrine, that there can be no diminution whatsoever,
and no obstruction or impediment whatsoever, by a riparian proprietor, in
the use of the water as it flows; for that would be to deny any valuable use
of it. There may be, and there must be allowed of that, which is common
to all, a reasonable use."24 Chancellor Kent, in the first edition of his Com-
mentaries, makes a similar statement:
Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a river has naturally
an equal right to the use of the water which flows in the stream
adjacent to his lands, as it was wont to run (currere solebat) with-
out diminution or alteration.... Aqua currit et debet currere, is
the language of the law... Streams of water are intended for the
use and comfort of man; and it would be unreasonable, and con-
trary to the universal sense of mankind, to debar every riparian pro-
prietor from the application of the water to domestic, agricultural
and manufacturing purposes. ... All that the law requires of the
party, by or over whose land a stream passes, is, that he should use
the water in a reasonable manner, and so as not to destroy, or ren-
der useless, or materially diminish, or affect the application of the
water by the proprietors below on the stream.2 5
Although the reasonable use test was generally adopted during the
middle third of the nineteenth century, the meaning of reasonableness was
not altogether clear at first. Kent's pronouncement, for example, might be
construed as defining a reasonable use to be one which did not materially
22. Bealey v. Shaw, 102 Eng. Rep. 1266 (Ex. 1805); Williams v. Morland, 107
Eng. Rep. 620 (Ex. 1824).
23. Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ex. 1851).
24. 24 Fed. Cas. 472, 474 (No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
25. 3 KENr, COMMENTARiEs 353-54 (lst ed. 1828).
[Vol. 35
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diminish the water or affect its use by lower riparians. However, this highly
restrictive interpretation was not followed.
A second possible definition of reasonableness looks to the nature of
the use itself, isolated from the surrounding circumstances. Here the ques-
tion is whether the use is reasonable in light of the needs of the user. To
some degree this test has been followed. The courts have consistently held
that domestic use of water is not only reasonable, but privileged to the
extent that the domestic user can lawfully exhaust the watercourse for this
purpose, even if the effect is to deprive lower riparians of water for their own
domestic uses. This approach has been reflected in the classification of
water uses as "natural" and "artificial," the former comprehending domes-
tic use, and the latter including manufacturing, agricultural and other uses.
By this approach, "natural" uses are always reasonable, but the others de-
pend upon the setting. In addition, some courts have declared certain uses,
such as using the stream to assimilate or carry off wastes (commonly denomi-
nated "pollution"), to be per se unreasonable.
A third approach, stressing the fact that the right of all riparians is
equal, has tended to ignore the practicalities of adjustment between the
correlative rights. Some courts, while employing the term "reasonable use,"
have nevertheless limited uses in terms of strict quantitative equality, per-
mitting a use only to such an extent that a similar use could be made by
all other riparians at the same time. Thus, in Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore v. Appold, the Maryland Court of Appeals in 1875 refused to
permit the city to add a supply of water to a stream, saying:
If the appellant has the right to empty an artificial stream of
water into "Roland's Run," every other riparian owner would be
entitled to the same right, and the necessary consequence would be,
not only to affect the quantity and increase the natural current of
the stream, but in fact to change the character and nature of the
stream itself. Such a use cannot be said to be incident to the
reasonable user of a stream; on the contrary, it goes beyond the na-
tural right to which the appellant, in common with all other pro-
prietors, is entitled .... 26
For the most part, however, the courts have adopted a fourth approach
which has tended to recognize the correlative nature of the interests in-
volved. For example, in the 1832 Connecticut decision of Twiss v. Bald-
win,2 7 the court referred to the maxim Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
in resolving a dispute between mill-owners over the flow of a stream. In
1855, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed in Wheatley v. Chrisman:
The proposition of the defendant was, that he had a legal right
to use a reasonable quantity for the purposes of his business. The
Court replied that his business might reasonably require more than
26. 42 Md. 442, 456 (1875).
27. 9 Conn. 291 (1832).
1970]
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he could take consistently with the rights of the plaintiff. We can-
not see how or on what principle the correctness of this can be im-
pugned. The necessities of one man's business cannot be the stand-
ard of another's rights in a thing which belongs to both.28
The determination of reasonableness thus requires a comparison of com-
peting uses. This meaning of reasonableness which recognizes the equality
of right in a correlative sense has been generally adopted in the Eastern
United States.
In determining reasonableness, then, it is necessary to consider in detail
the relative positions of the conflicting parties. Conflict of course, is neces-
sary, for unless one use interferes with another, the controversy giving rise
to the need to ascertain which use shall prevail never materializes. And
reasonableness will be determined only as between parties to the litigation.
Their uses may or may not be reasonable as against other persons not
parties, but the court does not reach this question.
While a full and complete delineation of what constitutes reasonable
use in every situation may not be possible, some attempt at listing the
principal elements has been made. It has been said that reasonable use
is a question of fact having regard to the subject-matter and
the use; the occasion and manner of its application; its object and
extent and necessity; the nature and size of the stream; the kind
of business to which it is subservient; the importance and neces-
sity of the use claimed by one party and the extent of the injury
caused by it to the other.29
Elements not considered in determining reasonableness include priority
of use and the extent of riparian frontage or riparian land. 30 Nor, aside
from the preference accorded domestic use, are any preferences recognized
between types or classes of use. In addition, it should be noted that non-use
of the riparian right does not constitute an abandonment or forfeiture,
and that new uses may be initiated at any time.
When the right of a riparian owner is infringed through an unreason-
able or unprivileged use, he may seek relief by way of injunction or dam-
ages. Failure to do so within the statutory period will give the wrongdoer
a prescriptive right to continue such use. Damages are frequently small in
amount. To avoid recurring actions for damages, injunctive relief is fre-
quently sought. Here, questions of extreme difficulty have sometimes arisen,
28. 24 Pa. St. 298, 302 (1855). A year later in Parker v. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn.
321 (1856), the court approved an instruction to the jury which stated in part:
That the question of reasonable use was one for the jury, and in dis-
posing of it they were not to look alone at what would be a reasonable use
at one mill if there were no others on the stream, but to take into con-
sideration the wants of the other mills, and from all the circumstances
say whether the use in the particular instance was reasonable.
29. Dunlap v. Caroline Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 820, 195 S.E. 43,
47 (1938). See also the classical language of the Minnesota court in Red Rover
Roller Mills v. Wright, 30 Minn. 249, 15 N.W. 167 (1883).
30. VI-A AMEPicA'N LAw oF PROPERTY § 28.55 (1954).
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as where the lower riparian with his little farm seeks to enjoin a wrongful
upstream use by a large industry. The courts have generally affirmed that
injunctive relief cannot "properly be refused on the ground of the magni-
tude of the defendant's interests and the importance of its business,"3 1 and
numerous decisions support this view.3 2 The problem here is that the lower
owner who is given injunctive relief is then free to play "dog-in-the-
manger"3 3 with the water unless the upper owner is willing to meet his price
for the property interest. Denial of injunctive relief, on the other hand,
amounts to giving the upper owner a virtual power of eminent domain,
simply because of the magnitude of his economic interest.
III. Tm UsEFuLNEss or RnARuANisM
It is apparent from the foregoing description that the riparian doctrine
possesses certain commendable aspects. Foremost among these is its flexi-
bility.3 4 The doctrine does not freeze water rights into an unyielding frame-
work, but leaves room for judicial recognition of developing social need and
new scientific verities. The courts are not bound by the static concepts of
any particular era in resolving disputes over water uses; instead, they are
free to shape water rights according to the needs of the particular time and
place. The doctrine permits a frank acknowledgement of shifting social
values and needs.
From the point of view of the riparian owner, the use of water under a
riparian right may be made at a time and in a manner most responsive to
his particular needs. The purpose of the use and the quantity of water taken
may be freely modified, qualified only by the reasonableness test. In addi-
tion, the use of water need not be constantly enjoyed in order to preserve
the right. Non-use even for a prolonged period will not affect the right to
resume a reasonable use at such time in the future as the needs of the
riparian may require. Accordingly, the riparian owner may accommodate
his water uses to the needs generated by his use of the land. Except where
the supply of water is uncertain or demand approaches the quantity of
water available, the riparian may freely plan for uses of water to be initiated
in the future.
Where conflicts arise, the riparian test of reasonableness embodies the
flexible concept of beneficial use. The riparian doctrine, in the words of
one writer, "facilitates an adjustment of conflicts between uses in accord-
31. Parket v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 602, 81 N.E. 468, 470
(1907).
32. See, e.g., Whalen v. Union Bag &c Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805(1913). The contrary position was taken in Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.,
113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
33. This "canine" characteristic of riparianism was remarked upon by Mr.
Justice Jackson in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 751 (1950).
34. FisHER, WEsTERN EXPERIENCE AND EAsTERN APPROPRIATION PROPOSALS, THE
LAW OF WATER ALLOcATION IN THE EAsTERN UNITED STATES 75, 78 (D. Haber Sc
S. Bergen ed. 1958).
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ance with the needs of each user and the dictates of the general public
interest."3 5 Thus, reasonable use may be favorably contrasted with a rigid
system of rights which balances priorities only according to the needs of
one brief moment in time and then fixes them as a yoke upon succeeding
generations.
When it appears that the riparian doctrine, as presently articulated by
the courts, fails to provide adequate solutions to water use problems, argu-
ably the proper response is not simply to abandon the doctrine through
radical adoption of water law systems created to solve the problems of dif-
ferent climates or cultures. Instead, resort should once more be had to the
common law to modify or even refashion the riparian doctrine to meet the
needs imposed by new conditions.
Granted, the riparian doctrine functions most effectively where water
supplies are normally adequate, with few potential conflicts between users,
and where the uses being made of the water are fairly constant and gen-
erally similar in nature, so as to provide a ready basis for comparison. The
doctrine is far less appropriate where water shortage is the usual condition,
with constant or frequently recurring conflict between users, and where
water uses are widely diversified in their nature. Here comparison of the
relative merit between uses becomes highly abstruse and complex, requiring
a great deal of detailed data. Even then such comparison depends in large
part upon sweeping value judgments as to what may constitute social
benefit or detriment.
Effective riparianism requires judges who are willing to examine care-
fully the relative positions of conflicting water users, and who are willing
to weigh large quantities of expert testimony and other scientific evidence.
In water cases the judges must be willing to frame judgments and decrees
which provide definite guidance to the parties in shaping their conduct,
and which contain provision for review and modification. Further, judges
must not hesitate, when circumstances warrant, to revise their conception
of which uses are the most beneficial and therefore to be favored. Changes
in the doctrine itself should be made where necessary to promote the in-
terests of riparian owners and the welfare of the public.
Given these conditions, the riparian doctrine will reflect the highest
qualities of the common law system, and may provide an excellent legal
framework for resolution of water use disputes.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF RYPARIANISM
Critics have identified a number of alleged deficiencies in the riparian
doctrine which bear examination. In making this examination, however,
care must be taken to recognize that some of the alleged shortcomings are
the necessary concomitants of the asserted benefits described in the preced-
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critics, for among their ranks are those who have an avowed and unswerv-
ing allegiance to the cause of universal adoption of a system of prior ap-
propriation.
The principal criticism of the riparian system is the uncertainty which
exists as to the right to use water.3 6 Because of the very nature of the rea-
sonable use concept, it cannot be known with any degree of definiteness
who may use the water, how much he can use, or for what purpose he can
use it. A use which today furnishes no basis for complaint may give rise to
a lawsuit tomorrow; what is reasonable at one moment may prove un-
reasonable shortly thereafter. A person initiating a particular use is un-
certain as to whether his use may interfere with the reasonable use being
made by some other person, or whether it may interfere with a reasonable
use which may be initiated by someone in the future. Further, the user has
no assurance that, after he has invested in an enterprise which depends
upon a given source of water, his supply will not be jeopardized by a new
and reasonable use made by some upper riparian. Any riparian owner (and
perhaps in some instances a non-riparian) may at any time initiate a new use
of water or increase the use which he is making, and it will be protected
if reasonable.
The uncertainty as to the dimensions of the right to use a specific
quantity of water from an ascertained source for a given purpose at a
definite time, is aggravated by the fact that the judicial mechanisms for
resolving water controversies are severely limited. Not only is litigation
time-consuming, expensive, and uncertain in its outcome, but the results,
even of successful litigation, are frustratingly narrow and limited in scope.
In addition, the courts are often unable or unwilling to fashion judg-
ments in water use disputes which will grant any broad degree of protec-
tion. First, a judgment relates only to the parties before the court. While
the court may be able to determine that as between riparians A and B on
the Black River, A's use of water for irrigation is reasonable and B's inter-
ference with it is wrongful, this judgment will not be enforceable against
Black River riparians C and D, who were not parties to the action. Nor is
it likely that the public interest in the beneficial use and development of
the water resource will receive significant attention in the litigation be-
tween A and B.
Second, the courts generally will not apportion the stream as between
the parties; the judgment will be an "all-or-nothing" finding for one party
or the other. Either A's use is reasonable and will be protected, or it is un-
reasonable and will not.3 7 The courts have been reluctant to explore the
36. See, e.g., Marquis, Freeman & Heath, The Movement for New Water
Rights Laws in the Tennessee Valley States, 23 TENN. L. RrEv. 797, 801 (1955);
Farnham, The Improvement and Modernization of New York Water Law Within
the Framework of the Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REv. 377, 378, 431-33
(1968).
87. There are exceptional cases, where the courts have made specific rulings
as to precisely what each of the parties may do. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark.
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possibile dimensions of an accommodation satisfactory to all parties. If
compromise is to be achieved, the parties must work it out among them-
selves. This judicial reluctance is attributable at least in part to the lack
of supervisory or planning facilities available to the courts.
Third, the judgment pertains only to the facts as they exist at a given
time. New developments which may change the relative positions of the
parties cannot be adequately dealt with. Therefore, as conditions change,
the old judgment becomes irrelevant, and the need for a new judicial de-
termination becomes evident. 8a
Nevertheless, litigation is the only practical course open to the riparian
seeking to vindicate his right. Under the riparian doctrine, administrative
determinations are unavailable. The water user is not likely to be able to
induce all other riparians on the watercourse to enter a consensual agree-
ment allowing him to use a definite quantity of water in a given manner.
Finally, attempts at self-help are likely to be futile in an era in which this
doctrine seems to be strongly disapproved.
Arguably, the uncertainties of riparianism and the limited scope of
judicial action have a detrimental effect upon beneficial water use and de-
velopment.3 9 One writer, for example, declares that under the riparian
doctrine, "there is insecurity in any investment for developing, storing, or
using water, because there is no assurance that other landowners will not
some day undertake to develop and use the same water."40 Others have
contended that investment is discouraged by the lack of security afforded
under the riparian doctrine 4 1 The failure to develop and use the water will
only result in serious waste of this valuable resource, because persons who
have a need for the water permit it to flow unused because of their un-
willingness to make capital investments due to the uncertainty of their
right.4 2
4.6, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Warren v. Westbrook Mfg. Co., 88 Me. 58, 33A. 665
(1895). Courts have generally been willing to construe grants to the use of water
with more precision than they have applied to purely riparian disputes. See, e.g.,
Patten Paper Co. v. Kaukauna Water-Power Co., 70 Wis. 659, 35 N.W. 737 (1887).
38. Of course the new determination will be as narrow in scope as the old
one. This no doubt has a considerable chilling effect upon the willingness of the
parties to undergo again the expense and pain of a lawsuit to determine their
rights.
39. See Farnham, supra note 36, at 378, text and n. 4, and at 406-08.
40. Thomas, Hydrology vs. Water Allocation in the Eastern United States,
Tm LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES, 165, 179-80
(D. Haber & S. Bergen ed. 1958).
41. See, e.g., Trelease, A Model State Water Code for Rivc& Basin Develop-
ment, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 301 (1957); Trelease, Policies for Water Law:
Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. REs. J. 1, 23
(1965).
42. As an example, assume that A wishes to construct a manufacturing plant
which will require the use of X gallons of water per day. He inspects a site on the
Black River, which he can purchase for a reasonable sum. Labor and power are
available, raw materials can be obtained close by, and transportation to market is
moderate in cost. The water in the Black River appears adequate. But does A
[Vol. 3,5
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Of course, this basic assumption may be incorrect. The investment
decision may not be affected in any measurable degree by lack of a certain
water supply. In reality, the whole matter of investing capital is fraught
with a congeries of uncertainties: prices, market conditions and demand,
raw material availability, taxes, labor cost, public regulation, power, trans-
portation. In comparison, water supply may assume a very minor role.
Further, it is difficult to find evidence that any system of property
rights has ever frustrated economic development when other conditions
were favorable. May not the economic cost of overcoming the water supply
uncertainty simply be accounted for as a part of developmental cost? And,
as contrasted with other costs, how significant is the cost of acquiring an
assured water supply, or of developing a substitute supply if the one in use
fails?
Other shortcomings of the riparian doctrine have been observed. No
adequate account is taken of the hydrological cycle, of the inter-relatedness
of all water sources. It is said that the limitation of water use to riparian
land is excessively restrictive, and prevents many uses which would clearly
be of benefit to individuals and to the public. In a related vein, the fact
that the riparian right is appurtenant to the riparian tract of land and can-
not be meaningfully transferred apart from the land is said to contribute
to the inability to put watercourses to optimum use. As described in the
next section, one solution proposed to alleviate the asserted shortcomings
of uncertainty and unduly restricted rights of use involves the free transfer
of the water use right, in a "quantified" condition, so that the transferee
would obtain an enforceable right to a specific quantity of water from an
ascertained source.
V. ALTEnNATIVES TO RiPAANISM
Can the riparian doctrine be modified so as to retain the advantages of
the reasonable use concept, while at the same time removing the objection-
have any assurance that it will remain adequate? How could he gain such as-
surance under the riparian doctrine?
Assume that A goes ahead and purchases the site and constructs his factory.
All goes well until A suddenly discovers that the water supply has diminished
below X gallons. His attention is turned upstream, and he discovers that since his
use began, two other factories have begun to use the water, and several farmers
have started to engage in supplemental irrigation. Again, what can A do? He
could take one or more of the other users to court and seek to establish that their
uses are unreasonable as contrasted with his. But what are his chances of suc-
cess? Prior use of the water gives him no better right. Are irrigators or upstream
factories engaged in unreasonable use? Can A show that it was in fact the defendant
irrigators and not the non-defendant factories (which he neglected to join in the
action) which caused his injury? And even if A does prevail, is not his something of
a Pyrrhic victory: for might not another new upstream user come upon the scene
immediately thereafter, forcing him to begin the whole litigation cycle over again?
One should also consider the possibility that if A is finding the water quantity
insufficient for his uses, are not downstream riparians experiencing the same short-
ages for their uses-and might they not choose to bring their actions against A,
claiming that his use was the cause of their loss?
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able features which hinder beneficial use of the water resource? Numerous
suggestions for reform have been advanced, some quite radical in the de-
gree of change which would result and others retaining at least some rec-
ognizable vestige of riparianism.
A. Prior Appropriation
One radical solution to the shortcomings of riparianism has been the
suggestion that the Western system of prior appropriation be adopted in
its place. One Eastern state, Mississippi, has followed this course through
legislation adopting such a system. 43 There have been a number of eloquent
proponents of prior appropriation, principally water scholars of Western
background. Dean Frank Trelease of the University of Wyoming College of
Law has asserted that "prior appropriation, in the balance, seems to be
the best extant system of law for river basin development in the United
States." 44
Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, reasonable use would be
abandoned, as well as the riparian owner's exclusive right to make use of
the watercourse. Adoption of the doctrine would come about through legis-
lation or constitutional amendment. Priority of use, properly recorded or
registered, would provide the criterion for allocating water use rights.
Appropriators would not need to be riparian owners but would only need
access to the water source. Once acquired, the right would be perpetual,
but could be lost by consistent nonuse. New uses could be accommodated,
so long as there was water available to initiate them. Where conflicts existed
between persons desiring to initiate new uses, preferential treatment would
be accorded those whose use was more beneficial, according to a priority
scale legislatively or administratively established. The appropriator would
receive a right to use a specified quantity of water from a determined source,
subject to the right of senior appropriators to satisfy their rights first. Some
prior appropriation states require that the water be used in connection
with particular tracts of land, and some further restrict the purpose of use
to that which the appropriator originally made. Other states allow change
to be made, sometimes only after administrative approval.
It is contended that the prior appropriation doctrine "avoids much of
the uncertainty inherent in the riparian rights rule" by giving "each ap-
propriator relative certainty as to the amount of water which will be avail-
able for his use." 45 Trelease asserts that the system is one of "secure water
rights that tend to encourage investment and thus lead to maximum use."4 6
However, the system provides certainty and security only to the few who
43. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 5956-01-30 (1966 Supp.).
44. Trelease, supra note 41, at 302. See also the discussion in Marquis, Free-
man & Heath, The Movement for New Water Rights Laws in the Tennessee Val-
ley States, 23 TrNN. L. REv. 797 (1955).
45. Marquis et al., supra note 44, at 832.
46. Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2 LAND & WATmR L. REv. 1, 36(1967).
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are assured a supply of water because their uses were initiated earliest in
time. Other appropriators will have water to use only if there is a supply
remaining after all senior appropriators have been satisfied to the full ex-
tent of their right. There is no proration in time of shortage. Inadequate
supply means that some users are fully supplied while others receive
nothing.
While it is frequently stressed that the prior appropriation system en-
sures the maximum beneficial use of water, there is valid cause for believing
that the system instead tends to "freeze" uses of water into a rigid pattern
based upon the purposes for which the water was used at the time the ap-
propriation was originally begun. While Western law requires that water
use shall be beneficial,47 there do not appear to be adequate mechanisms
established whereby uses which are non-beneficial may be eliminated. While
some states allow "superior" uses to oust "inferior" ones (upon payment of
due compensation),48 the basis for such private condemnation is too in-
definite to permit ready replacement of those uses which may be of less
than maximum public benefit. A typical statute may provide that agricul-
tural purposes are to be preferred over industrial uses, and that a higher
use may acquire water by condemning an inferior one, but seldom is it
sufficiently broad to permit a more beneficial use of a given class to con-
demn another use of the same class. 49 The result is that there is no prac-
tical means of discouraging uses which have ceased to be beneficial or
which use the water in an inefficient manner. Consequently, appropriators
are not impelled to adopt water-saving methods or new, more beneficial
uses.
Similarly, the forces of the market place cannot be confidently relied
upon to maintain uses of the highest beneficial nature in the prior appro-
priation system. For example, the appropriative right may be restricted to a
particular use, or a particular tract of land. While many states do provide
that administrative approval may be obtained to permit the water right to
be transferred apart from the land, this does not guarantee that such
transfers will take place. The "dog-in-the-mangerism" which characterizes
riparianism at its logical extreme50 may also exist under prior appropria-
tion where an appropriator continues to make an efficient use of the water
in spite of demand by other persons who wish to make a more effective and
beneficial use of it.
47. 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 19.2 (1967).
48. Id. § 22.7.
49. Washington, for example, is an exception. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
90.03.040 (1962), provides: "In condemnation proceedings the court shall determine
what use will be for the greatest public benefit, and that use shall be deemed a
superior one;" but that one irrigator cannot condemn the water of another who is
irrigating "by the most economical method of artificial irrigation applicable to
such land according to the usual methods of artificial irrigation employed in the
vicinity where such land is situated."
50. See note 88 supra.
1970]
17
Lauer: Lauer: Reflections on Riparianism
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Further objections to prior appropriation may be made on the ground
that the constitutional and statutory provisions which prefer certain kinds
of uses are often arbitrary. They may reflect the values and conditions of
an earlier day, rather than modern needs. The result is that the system
tends to reflect the maxim Aqua currit.
Thus, while the "first come, first served" norm of prior appropriation
may have been fitting for a frontier society in which the earliest settlers
were properly accorded a reward for their hardiness, it would not in prac-
tice seem to give any conclusive benefits over riparianism as the basis for
Eastern water law. Prior appropriation should be looked upon as it actually
is, a means whereby, in a water-poor land, the first inhabitants excluded
later arrivals from the water.
B. The Permit System
A second solution has been the creation of a regulatory system whereby
permits to use water would be issued by a state agency, for a designated
term of years. Iowa has adopted such a "permit system," 51 and it has also
been proposed for adoption in other states in the Model Water Use Act.5"
The typical permit system would establish a state regulatory agency to
inventory water resources, prepare a state comprehensive water plan, issue
and renew permits for the use of water, and police uses made under the
permits. Persons desiring to use water would apply to the agency for a
permit, which after investigation would be issued if the proposed use were
"beneficial" and would not have an adverse effect upon other users or upon
available water resources. 53 Permits would be issued for a limited time,5 4
with provision for renewal. Some uses, such as those for domestic purposes
or those involving the consumption of only a minimal amount of water,
would be exempt from regulation. Further, the Model Water Use Act55 (but
not the Iowa statute 6) would exempt from regulation those persons making
lawful uses at the effective date of the legislation. Limited provision is made
for transfer or modification of rights acquired under the permits.
Permit systems nevertheless possess certain deficiencies. The legislative
standard for allowing water use, comprehended within the term "bene-
ficial," is not notably definite. The shortcoming is compounded by the
fact that a state administrative agency must apply this uncertain standard
to each permit application. Experience would seem to disclose a high likeli-
hood of breakdown and maladministration when a state agency is given
broad control over a crucial aspect of social and economic concern with no
51. IOWA CODE § 455A (1962).
52. Approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1958.
53. MODEL WATER UsE ACr § 407 (1958).
54. IowA, CODE § 455A.20 (1962), provides that permits shall be issued for
terms not to exceed ten years; the MODEL WATEr USE Acr § 406 (1958) suggests
a maximum of fifty years.
55. MODEL WATER USE ACr § 303 (1958).
56. IowA CODE § 455A.26 (1962).
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firm standards to limit exercise of its discretion. Is there any reason to be-
lieve that water agencies will be different?
There is also reason to question whether a permit system will bring
about needed flexibility in water use. Those uses allowed under the permit
when originally issued may in practice be "frozen", with little or no prospect
of change, even though legislation allows modification or transfer of the
permit upon agency approval. While some opportunity would seem to
exist for reexamination of water uses when permits expire and renewals
are sought, there is a real danger that renewals will simply be perfunctory,
given almost as a matter of right if the permit holder has not been found
guilty of serious misuse.57 It is also doubtful whether the renewal procedure
will be looked upon as a free and open competition for the available sup-
ply between all those persons wishing to make use of the water, with new
permits granted to those whose uses are demonstrated to be the most highly
beneficial. The likely effect will be that there is little observable difference
in practice between the permanent use rights of prior appropriation and
the "temporary" ones of the permit system.
Constitutional problems are also posed by any proposals to abandon
the riparian doctrine in favor of either a permit system or a prior appropria-
tion system. Plainly such a change would entail a loss by riparian propri-
etors of some significant attributes of their right as it now exists. No longer
would riparian owners have the exclusive right to utilize the water of
streams. The riparian's right to initiate future uses subject only to the
reasonableness requirement would be abolished. Arguably the destruction
or substantial alternation of the present system would amount to a taking of
property in the constitutional sense, for which compensation would be re-
quired.
A modification of lesser proportion was brought about only by con-
stitutional amendment in California. 58 The Model Water Use Act seeks to
avoid the constitutional problem through a compromise which would pre-
serve uses actually being made by riparian owners, as well as the right to
initiate new domestic uses.59 The Iowa and Mississippi legislation, as well
as the Model Act, turn to the police power, based upon a legislative declara-
tion of public need, for the authority to restrict the riparian right as
previously declared.
No courts have ruled upon the constitutionality of these Eastern acts.
Some Western courts have upheld legislative modification on the basis
of the police power,60 while others have not.61 There seems no definitive
57. E. MURPHY, GOVERNING NATURE 289 (1967).
58. CAL. CONST. art. 14, § 3, as amended in 1928.
59. CAL. CONsT. art. 14, § 3.
60. Knight v. Grimes, 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964); State ex rel.
Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440 (1949); In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112,
227 P. 1065 (1924).
61. Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irrigation & Improvement Co., 45 Neb.
798, 64 N.W. 239 (1895); Bigelow v. Draper, 6 N.D. 152, 69 N.W. 570 (1896). Cf.
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answer to this problem. Rather evidently it will have to be dealt with by
each state supreme court on an individual basis with much depending
upon the extent of modification which would be brought about by the
legislative enactment, and upon the degree of water crisis which may exist
in the state at the time the issue is raised.
C. Economic Determinism
A third solution, which shall be denominated "economic determinism",
would employ the mechanisms of the market and economic value to pro-
vide the conceptual framework for socially-approved water use. This ap-
proach, which has won numerous adherents in recent years,62 is succinctly
described by Professor Earl Finbar Murphy:
The only answer lies in working the whole mass of renewable
resources out of the category of free goods and into a cost-benefit.
analysis reflective of the total price paid for their development 6 3
An excellent discussion of economic determinism as applied to the
field of water use law is provided by Professor Donald R. Levi, who advo-
cates an approach to water use regulation based fundamentally upon
economic values. 64 Expressing his criterion as "highest and best use," he
states:
The concept of "highest and best use" calls for the use which
will yield the greatest (positive) net profit. This is analogous to
the "most beneficial use" concept in economic theory .... Rather
than viewing one use as being categorically higher valued than
another, it requires that each unit of water be allocated to the use
wherein the incremental value of the product induced is a
maximum.65
Professor Levi suggests two alternatives by which this goal could be
reached. First, the water rights of riparian owners might be "quantified"
in terms of a specific amount of water or a percentage of the flow to which
each woud be entitled; this quantified water right could then be trans-
ferred apart from the land to which it was originally appurtenant.6 6 Sec-
ond, an administrative permit system might be created whereby water use
would only be allowed pursuant to a permit issued according to standards
Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926),
the effect of which was overcome by the 1928 California constitutional amend-
menL
62. See, e.g., J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. MILLMAN & J. DEHAvrN, WATER SUPPLY:
ECONOMIcs, TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY (1960); KRUrILLA & ECKSTEIN, MULTIPLE
PURPOSE RIVER DEVELOPMENT: STUDIES IN APPLIED ECONoM-IC ANALYSIS (1958).
63. E. MURPHY, GOVERNING NATURE 285 (1967).
64. Levi, Highest and Best Use: An Economic Goal for Water Law, 34 Mo.
L. REV. 165 (1969).
65. Id. at 176.
66. Id. at 173-74.
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set forth by the legislature or by the administrative agency itself and based
upon economic cost-benefit analysis.67 Permits would be freely transferable
with provision for forced transfer from "lower" to "higher" uses. The goal
of the permit system would be to achieve results similar to those "obtain-
able from a freely transferable water right in a purely competitive mar-
ket."68
In spite of this last statement it is doubtful whether Professor Levi
is in fact advocating pure economic determinism which holds that only
quantitatively measurable economic criteria should be used in determining
who shall have the right to use water. First, the value of water uses is not
measurable in economic terms alone; non-economic values must also be
considered.6 9 Second, the "net profit" basis for determining benefit, while
workable for some classes of cases, fails to account for other measurable
and valid criteria. For example, what should be done when a competing use
would employ more persons, at a higher wage, yet reflect a lower net profit
than would another use? While theoretically, capital would desert a low-
profit industry in favor of a higher-profit investment (so that the above ex-
ample is not "sound" in terms of pure economic analysis) the fact is that
vast amounts of capital have tended to remain in many important in-
dustries which have an endemic problem of low net profit. Third, Pro-
fessor Levi's assumption of a "purely competitive market" as a measuring-
stick of efficiency which the quantified, freely-transferable water right would
provide, is utterly imaginary. Whether the market was ever purely competi-
tive, it is certainly not so today, due principally to governmental intervention
in the form of public subsidy, public expenditure, tax incentives, limitation
of imports, and so forth.
Thus, while economic analysis may add to the understanding of the
relative benefits of competing water uses, it does not and cannot provide
an acceptable solution to the problem. As recognized by S. V. Giriacy-Wan-
trup, a leading water economist, "Economics cannot define social optima
which the law-as 'social engineering'-should aim to realize." 7°
67. Id. at 175-76. Professor Levi recognizes that the legislature might initially
designate use preferences such as domestic, municipal, etc. But he hopefully foresees
that in the future the administrative agency might be freed of these limitations so
as to be able to "determine when value changes occur in the societal preference
scale." Id. at 176.
68. Id. at 174.
69. Professor Levi recognizes this, saying, "Recreation . . . is a use which it
is difficult to analyze in a cost-benefit framework. In other words, it is difficult to
quantify the benefits enuring by reason of recreational uses of water." Id. at 169.
The difficulty has not prevented some attempts. See, e.g., Kneese, Economic and
Related Problems in Contemporary Water Resources Management, 5 NAT. REs. J.
236, 241-44 (1965).
70. S. Ciracy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System of
Water Rights, in THE LAw OF WATEa ALLOCATION IN THE EAsTEaN UNrrED STATES
531, 551-52 (D. Haber & S. Bergen ed. 1958).
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D. "Quantifying" the Water Right
Economic determinism aside, Professor Levi's suggestions of "quantify-
ing" the water right and making it freely transferable are worthy of examina-
tion, since they would effectively solve the principal alleged shortcomings
of the riparian system. But while these goals are themselves desirable, the
problem is the practical one of accomplishing them.
If the water right related only to a quantity of water for a consumptive
purpose, it would be possible to divide the watercourse into consumable
shares. But a difficulty is posed by the intensely correlative nature of the
riparian right and, its application not only to consumptive but also to
nonconsumptive uses, such as power and recreation. The effect of any use
will depend upon where it is made, where the water is diverted, and where
any surplus is returned to the stream. Therefore, quantification would have
to be determined with reference to certain fixed elements, which in turn
would require that the water be used in a particular place or manner.
This would defeat much of the advantage which could be gained through
free transferability. While a degree of quantification could be achieved so
as to permit free transfer, it would only be at the cost of a substantial
"cushion" of wasted water such as is involved in maintaining a guaranteed
average or minimum flow. While these problems may not be insuperable,
the discovery of feasible solutions must precede any attempt at quantifica-
tion.
E. Water Development
It is also possible that radical changes in the riparian doctrine are un-
necessary, that modification of property rights in water is in fact an inap-
propriate approach to the problem of developing adequate water supplies
and assuring that the supplies are beneficially used. The optimum answer
may lie in creating instrumentalities whereby water supplies may be ac-
quired, developed, and protected on a watershed or district basis and em-
powering these instrumentalities, within the present framework of riparian
law, to acquire by purchase or condemnation the water rights needed.
That such a system is already in existence may be appreciated through
an examination of the behavior and practices of those municipalities and
water districts which have developed water supplies for their inhabitants.
Thus, in spite of the fact that municipal use is probably nonriparian in
nature and therefore violative of the rights of riparian owners7 1 it is clear
that thousands of municipalities in the Eastern states today derive their
water supplies from watercourses. Armed with the power of eminent domain
and ample purses, municipalities have taken what they have needed. They
have created elaborate water distribution systems and developed sources of
water supply by means of dams and reservoirs, transwatershed diversions,
and other devices. In addition, rural and other water supply districts,
71. Ziegler, Water Use Under Common Law Doctrine, WATER REsouRcEs
AND THE LAW 51, 65-67 (1958).
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backed by governmental loans and credit, have sprung up in large numbers
in the Eastern states. All of this has been accomplished within the property
rights framework of riparianism.
F. Modification of the Riparian Doctrine
The success of these distributional systems suggests that the answer to
the deficiencies of riparianism may not be found in wholesale revision of the
law which creates and defines private rights in water. As long as existing
water rights can in fact be purchased or condemned, their existence poses no
problem which cannot be overcome. The real need is to provide legal
mechanisms whereby water supplies can be developed cooperatively through
public or quasi-public action, so that existing water resources can be ef-
ficently made available to persons needing the use of water.
On the other hand, some modification of the riparian doctrine would
enhance the functioning of mechanisms whose purpose it is to permit joint
and cooperative development of water resources for public supply. For ex-
ample, legislation declaratory of the scope and extent of the riparian right
would add clarification and certainty to acquisition and condemnation of
water rights. Nonriparian use could be made non-actionable in the absence
of a showing of actual damage through interference with a riparian use.
Some qualification of the riparian right might be accomplished through
legislation relating the size of the riparian tract or the riparian frontage to
the quantity or proportion of the water which might be consumptively
used. The extent of riparian land might be defined. Legislation might pro-
vide that a riparian owner who developed a new supply of water would be
entitled to its full use, thereby clarifying a present uncertainty. Limitations
upon injunctive relief could be imposed, requiring injured riparian owners
to resort to damage actions only. Procedures for litigation involving the en-
tire class of affected riparian owners could be developed.
Finally, any modification of the riparian doctrine must take account
of the hydrological cycle. It is extremely fortunate that our disregard of
natural conditions has not yet caused any serious conflicts, but this situa-
tion cannot be relied upon to continue. Water law must presuppose the
hydrological cycle, and legal doctrine must be consistent with reality.
The time has come, therefore, for the law to cease dealing with
watercourses, underground water, and diffused surface water as though they
were wholly unconnected entities. Conflicts between users of different forms
of water are bound to occur in increasing numbers as demand for water
rises, and the law must provide standards and procedures whereby these
conflicts can be resolved. Some legislation has begun to treat the water re-
source as a single entity, thereby pointing the way for others to follow. 72
72. ALAsKA CoMP. LAwS ANN. § 46.15.260 (1966), for example, does not dis-
tinguish between watercourses, lakes, ground waters and diffused surface waters,
but simply uses the term "source of water" to comprehend all of these. The Model
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VI. THE ROAD AHEAD
It is evident that any effort to solve the water crisis in the Eastern
United States must involve some modification of the traditional riparian
doctrine. It is equally clear that modification is beyond the present ability
of the judiciary, which has found it increasingly difficult to perpetuate a
viable common law system. The courts have retreated from their time-
honored role of policy-makers, and for the most part have come to occupy
the status of interpreters of positive law laid down by the legislatures and
of preservers of earlier judicial doctrines. Repeatedly in answer to en-
treaties of counsel that earlier judge-made law is inconsistent with present-
day needs and conditions, the courts have turned away, declaring only that
change lies with the legislative branch of government. 73 Furthermore, ad-
judication is not an appropriate vehicle for comprehensive modification
of substantive or procedural law. Relief, then, must lie with the legislatures.
While the nature and magnitude of the remedy are not immediately
clear, some aspects are abundantly plain. The complexity of the problem
prevents a simplistic solution. Nor will the doctrines fashioned under dif-
ferent conditions, in another time and place, be adequate. Therefore, adop-
tion of a prior appropriation system is not acceptable. Rather, a doctrine
must be devised which will take account of the present and foreseeable
needs of the Eastern states. Since those needs vary from state to state, the
solution may assume a pluralistic form.
Any new or modified doctrine must recognize the economic values in-
herent in existing rights, which must not be impaired or destroyed without
provision for adequate compensation. Additionally, we must permit in-
dividual choice and action to the greatest degree commensurate with the
common good. Governmental fiat should not replace private decision-mak-
ing except where it is clear that individuals lack the ability, the means, or
the inclination to make necessary choices which society demands. Economic
determinism must not control public need, particularly in those areas in
which public need may not be susceptible of measurement in quantitative
economic terms.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the new doctrine must not simply
be a rule of negative restraint. Rather, it must reinforce the need to put
water to its highest beneficial use, and to prevent either waste or dog-in-
die-manger tactics which prevent beneficial use. Water law can and must
73. An author makes extreme statements of this kind strictly at his own risk.
And it must be confessed that very recently, it has begun to appear that the com-
mon law might be revived at the mouth of the crypt. Two significant indications
of this have come from the Missouri Supreme Court in the Fall of 1969. In Keener
v. Dayton Electric Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969), the common law doctrine
of strict products liability was adopted in Missouri. And in two companion cases
decided on November 10, the Supreme Court En Banc abolished the doctrine of
charitable tort immunity. Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo.
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be a positive force in inducing the optimum use of water through affirma-
tive rules which will impel uses of water which are of the greatest public
benefit.
This cannot be achieved without study, without an exchange of ideas,
without an interplay of all those persons whose interests are affected. In
this sense we have for too long limited our focus to narrow considerations of
riparianism versus prior appropriation. By and large this has proved fruit-
less. It is time to engage in a new dialogue, on new terms, with a new and
wider vision. The mission is to devise a legal doctrine for water use in the
Eastern United States which meets the needs of the age. It is long overdue.
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